The Szlonzoks and their Language: Between Germany, Poland and Szlonzokian Nationalism

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¹ This word is spelt in accordance with the rules of the Polish orthography and, thus, should be pronounced as /shlohnzohks/.
Abstract

This article analyzes the emergence of the Szlonzokian ethnic group or proto-nation in the context of the use of language as an instrument of nationalism in Central Europe. When language was legislated into the statistical measure of nationality in the second half of the nineteenth century, Berlin pressured the Slavophone Catholic peasant-cum-worker population of Upper Silesia to become ‘proper Germans’, this is, German-speaking and Protestant.

To the German ennationalizing pressure the Polish equivalent was added after the division of Upper Silesia between Poland and Germany in 1922. The borders and ennationalizing policies changed in 1939 when the entire region was reincorporated into wartime Germany, and, again, in 1945 following the incorporation of Upper Silesia into postwar Poland. The frequent changes of borders and ennationalizing pressures produced some Germans and Poles, but, above all, the two conflicting nationalisms nullified one another, this solidifying the Szlonzokian ethnicity of the majority of the population. Communism further alienated the Szlonzoks vis-à-vis Polishdom; and the possibility of emigrating to West Germany made them closer to Germandom. Since 1989 those Szlonzoks who have obtained German passports without leaving Poland declare themselves to be Germans, whereas the majority who have not and who feel to have been abused by the Polish state, declare themselves to be Szlonzoks and increasingly express this identity in national terms. All these policy and identification changes have been legitimized through the Szlonzoks’ multilingual social reality. Berlin, Warsaw and the Szlonzoks have interpreted this multilingualism and specific social behavior patterns connected to it, accordingly, as ‘German’, ‘Polish’, or ‘Szlonzokian’.

Keywords: Szlonzoks, language, ethnolect, nationalism, Germany, Poland.

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1 To ennationalize, that is, to shape a group of people into a nation, or to make part of a nation through incorporating a person or a group of people into this nation.
**Introduction**

Language has always been used to differentiate between groups of people (cf. Haugen, 1976: 361ff). But it is in Central Europe that the politicization of this most significant medium of interhuman communication has been most pronounced. Language is at the very basis of the Central European nationalisms. Speaking a language equals nationality in this part of Europe. Those speaking this language are considered to be a nation, and the geographical range of their settlement is considered the territory of this nation’s ‘true’ nation-state (Kamusella, 2001).

This specific coupling of nationalism and language stems from the use of Herderian thought for political ends. In his 1813 song ‘What is the German’s Fatherland?’ the poet Ernst Moritz Arndt answered this question: ‘[the land that extends as] far as the German tongue rings’ (in Schulze, 1991: 54). At this time during the _Befreiungskriege_ (War of Liberation)_3_ German nationalism was forged in opposition to that was French and the French themselves.4 In the wake of the Napoleonic Wars the rulers and aristocracy of the states in the territory of the erstwhile Holy Roman Empire5 replaced French with German as the medium of ‘cultured communication’.6 This ideological preference for German as the language of the German nation-in-making formed the political basis for the conceptual transformation of language into the measure of nationality. This novel concept was put into practical use during the trial censuses conducted in some of Prussia’s provinces during the 1820s (Davies, 1981: 132; Dzewulski, 1972: 102). In 1846 the Silesian-born historian Heinrich Wuttke proposed that on the road to the German nation-state the whole population of Prussia should become proficient in the German language (Ther in Cordell, 2000: 73). In 1861

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3 This is, the War of the Sixth Anti-Napoleonic Coalition.
4 Arndt expressed this in the following words: ‘Let the unanimity of your hearts be your church, let hatred of the French be your religion, let Freedom and Fatherland be your saints, to whom you pray!’ (1814: 430).
5 Napoleon dissolved this empire in 1806.
6 Friedrich the Great is one of the most potent symbols of German nationalism. But when he could he preferred to speak in French. His friendship with Voltaire and the name of his Potsdam residence, Sans Souci, do indicate this Prussian king’s linguistic preference.
the question about language construed as the measure of one’s nationality was included in the statewide Prussian census (cf. Triest, 1864).

Later the Prussian statistician Richard Böckh produced two influential works *Die statistische Bedeutung der Volksprache als Kennzeichen der Nationalität* (1866) and *Der Deutschen Volkszahld und Sprachgebiet* (1870) (Anon., 1888). These works caused the International Statistical Congress, convened at St. Petersburg in 1872, to accept language as the ‘objective’ indicator of nationality. This became the standard approach to ‘measuring’ nations in Central Europe after this question had been included in the Austro-Hungarian census in 1880 (Hobsbawm, 1990: 97, 100). But this measuring of nations soon proved to be something completely unintended. It rather created than measured nations. This was so because censuses started providing nationalists with demographic figures as a political argument to be used in forging their striven-for nations.

**Language and identity**

In the pre-modern world people spoke in order to communicate and did not have to speak something reified as a language. What mattered was the contents of the message and its successfully conveyance from one interlocutor to another. For the purpose of identification religion, the line of genealogical descent and the place of origin (birth) were of more import (Armstrong, 1982: 282; Billig, 1995: 31; Clark in Spencer, 1985: 389).9

National languages of today are a very recent product of modernization and nationalism (Hobsbawm, 1990: 60-61). Prior to the introduction of writing language differed slightly and gradually from village to village, parish to parish, principality to principality.10 These areas of graded linguistic change are conceptualized as ‘dialect continua’ (Crystal, 1987: 25).11 Zones of sharp

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7 *The Statistical Significance of the People’s Speech as the Indicator of Nationality* (my translation).
9 Obviously, language difference that prevented any meaningful communication isolated human groups (speech communities) (Barbujani, 1990) and could lead to politicization of language. This phenomenon occurred in the fifteenth century during the Hussite Wars when some thinkers pitted Bohemian (Czech) against German. But this development was rather ambiguous and, at that time, did not turn language into an instrument of politics (Zientara, 1996: 27).
10 Of course, this sketch relates to the European sedentary experience and, for the sake of brevity, disregards such complications as nomadism or pastoralism.
11 Present-day Central Europe partially overlaps with three of such continua, namely: North Slavic (from Vladivostok to the Polish-German border), West Germanic (from England to Austria’s southern and eastern borders and to Germany’s eastern border) and South-Slavic
linguistic change only existed at the borders between such continua. If motivated to establish and maintain contact speakers bridged this gap in comprehension in several ways. First, the dominated learned the language of the dominating. Second, if the speech communities were of equal social status this could promote bilingualism. Third, a contact language could develop through incorporation of various elements from both the dialect continua (cf. Armstrong, 1982: 251).

This third phenomenon can stagnate or it can develop. If a contact language is of temporary use only, linguists label it as a ‘pidgin language’. But if spouses coming from different dialect continua communicate with each other and their offspring in a pidgin, it becomes the first language of the children. Thus, it is transformed into a creole (Fischer, 1999: 179; Romaine, 1988). The creole-speakers can remain in touch with those who use dialects from the original dialect continua. Depending on the vagaries of social dynamics a creole continuum can come into being as a spanning element between the dialect continua (McArthur, 1992: 798).

Writing is closely related to the rise and growth of polities. Without this skill modern states would probably not have been established (cf. Coulmas, 1989; Tymowski, 1999). The skill of writing is invariably connected to the power center, which, in the European context, was the capital. In most areas of Central Europe the very first written language was Latin. It was employed for

(From Slovenia to Bulgaria). Within this area there are also isolated remnants of some dialect continua that hardly developed or that ceased to exist. These are represented today by Greek, Finno-Ugric Hungarian and Estonian or Baltic Latvian and Lithuanian (Crystal, 1987: 25). The term `speech community' designates a human group that speaks its own ethnolect. This is, an idiom that provides this group with an internal cohesion and the ethnic boundary that differentiates it from other groups (cf. Raith, 1987).

An enlightening example of grassroots fostering of multilingualism comes from the region of Pozsony/Pressburg (Bratislava). To ease everyday communication speakers of Hungarian, Slovak, German and Croatian living there developed a special way of language learning. Parents from different speech communities exchanged children for a few months (or even a year) enabling them to acquire the languages of the neighbor speech communities. This tradition commenced in the eighteenth century, was strong until the 1910s, and did not disappear completely until the 1980s (Liszka, 1996).

Popularly one speaks of creoles in the context of contact languages that developed through the interaction of local and European languages in colonies (Arends, 1995: xv). But the specific and long-sustained contact between Norman French conquerors and English subjects seems to have spawned the Anglo-French creole (also known as Anglo-Norman) (McArthur, 1992: 69), which, in turn, gave rise to Middle English with a lot of Romance vocabulary and Romancized syntax (cf. Berndt, 1984: 23-35). Thus, it is justified to use the concept of creole in a more general manner.

Slavonic of Greater Moravia written in the Glagolitic script disappeared from Central Europe after the state's demise at the beginning of the tenth century. It continued to be used, however, in the Catholic Slavonic liturgy on the Croatian island of Krk until the beginning of
rudimentary administration and diplomatic contacts. Because the ruler’s chancellery shaped and controlled the written form and usage of such Latin, it is termed a ‘chancery language’. With intensification of intrastate relations new chancery languages came into being on the basis of everyday dialects that the ruling strata spoke at the power centers. Chancery German emerged in the thirteenth century (Lubos, 1995: 25), chancery Bohemian16 (Czech) in the fifteenth century and chancery Polish in the sixteenth century (Siatkowska, 1992: 350).

The broader use of the chancery languages for writing books, prose and poetry transformed them into literary languages. Instrumental for this process was the invention of the printing press.17 The growing number of prints standardized the graphic representation of the chancery/literary language and spread the knowledge of it among ever-wider circles of society (Anderson, 1991: 43-46). In Central Europe this meant that the members of the estates mastered this language. Grammars and dictionaries set the borders of acceptable usage. This usage was inculcated in an increasing number of speakers through the growing state administration and the mass media of the press and cheap books. Finally, in the nineteenth century, the enfranchisement of the male half of

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16 I use the label ‘Bohemian’ rather than Czech because this chancery language stemmed from the dialect of Central Bohemia (this is, from around Prague). A similar though later process took place in Moravia, where the local Slavic chancery language was dubbed Moravian. The two languages were merged into standard Czech (developed from Bohemian) only at the close of the nineteenth century (cf. Triest, 1864).

17 Some literary languages emerged prior to the coming of print (Greek, Latin, Old Slavic, Italian, French or English). But they were few and their emergence was connected to religions and empires. Equally few pre-modern European polities had enough economic and political clout to support the costly use of local vernaculars as literary languages.
In 1926 the American linguist Leonard Bloomfield (p. 162) defined dialects as those language forms which speakers can use communicate with one another successfully while employing their own idioms during conversation. Conversely, if the idioms of two interlocutors are not mutually comprehensible, they speak two different languages. This commonsensical and popularly accepted distinction between a dialect and a language fails to reflect the socially and geographically continuous nature of language, as well as the dominance of the extralinguistic (this is, politics) in taking a decision about what is a language and what is not. Thus, the identical Romanian and Moldovan are regarded as two separate languages, while mutually incomprehensible idioms of China are regarded as dialects of the Chinese language.

German was standardized during the eighteenth century, and Polish and Czech during the first four decades of the nineteenth century (Siatkowska, 1992: 274; Szulc, 1999: 57-85). Nevertheless, until the close of the eighteenth century the Prussian aristocracy spoke in French. Change came about with the Napoleonic Wars. The birth of German nationalism elevated German to the rank of a national language. In line with the Central European paradigm of politicizing language, after 1848 activists of non-German nationalisms also strove to gain this status for their languages. The Poles and the Czechs achieved some success in this regard during 1869 and in the 1880s, respectively. For Polish they secured the role of the crownland language in Galicia, and Czech became another crownland language besides German in Bohemia. However, Polish and Czech were made into unambiguous national languages only in 1918 when Poland and Czechoslovakia became independent nation-states (Johnson, 1996: 136-143).

Between language and dialect

The stark politicization of language turned the seemingly scholarly and objective relationship between language and dialect\(^\text{18}\) into an extremely sensitive matter. In Central Europe if a dialect is a language or forms part of a language, the

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speakers of the dialect, per definitione, form a nation or its constituent part. In 1918 the region split into numerous self-proclaimed and ethnolinguistically defined nation-states (Rothschild, 1974). Thus, the capitals perceive the declaration of the existence of a new language as a direct danger to the integrity of their nations and nation-states (cf. Ostrowski, 2000; Spagińska-Pruszak, 1997).

Prior to the coming into being of a language there are only dialects (Ammon, 1987). Due to the long-established tradition of sedentarism in Europe coupled with the territorially of the modern state (Pierson, 1996: 48), linguists identify a dialect with a principality, or, today, with a region. The longer the continuous tradition of political existence of a region the more distinctive a dialect can be. Territorial variations within an area of a dialect (usually coterminous with localities and parishes) are dubbed ‘subdialects’ (McArthur, 1992: 290). The model is ideologized but rather closely corresponds to the socio-cultural reality of Europe.

But what is a language? According to the popular saying attributed to the US linguist Max Weinreich (or his pupil Joshua Fishman) ‘a language is a dialect with an army and navy’. In 1589 George Puttenham succinctly noted the inherent political character of every language in The Art of English Poesie: ‘After a speech is fully fashioned to the common understanding, and accepted by consent of a whole country and nation, it is called a language’ (in Evans, 1968: 374). Politicians interacting with the population they govern make languages. A language is more a political than a linguistic fact. To paraphrase Anderson (1991) a language is as much imagined as a nation. But when it has been fashioned it does exist19.

Developing a language that is accepted by the rulers and the ruled and serves as the only medium of communication in every situation of private and public life, dramatically increases the internal cohesion of a polity (cf. Haugen, 1966). Significantly, there are no languages prior to writing20, and a language

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19 Cf. how decisions of missionaries as to what translation of the Bible to use influenced codification of African languages, and how arbitrary these decisions were. Had a different decision been taken a completely different language would have developed (Hastings, 1997: 156-157).

20 It happens that Westerners term some unwritten dialects used in postcolonial states as ‘languages’. In this manner they project the Eurocentric and politicized concept of language onto non-Western parts of the world. This is required by the logic of decolonization that transformed the former colonies in the likeness of the Western nation-states. So if nowadays ‘natives’ are citizens in their own nation-states and not in colonies; they have to speak languages, and not: dialects, idioms, vernaculars, jargons, lingoes or kitchen speeches as it used to be prior to independence. It is so even if for administrative and educational purposes the postcolonial state employs a colonial language of the former Western masters and there has been no effort to write down and standardize the exclusively oral dialects, which the
cannot be successfully standardized without the popular literacy that forms the basis for its spread into every corner of a polity (cf. Bowers, 1968). Most existing languages were standardized during the twentieth century either in the colonial or postcolonial period (cf. Sow, 1999: 526-548).

When language functions as an instrument of differentiation between groups of people it is termed an ‘ethnolect’. Significant differentiation can arise at the level of a locality, region or polity so an ethnolect can be a subdialect, dialect, dialect cluster (this is, a group of interrelated dialects) or language (Majewicz, 1989: 10-11). However, nowadays the nation-state is the model of basic social and political organization (cf. Kohn, 1962). After the collapse of communism and the break-up of the Soviet Union the neat division of the world (at least the political map) into the latticework of nation-states was completed.

The nation-state being the top-notch political player, it effectively controls and directs language planning. Those groups that have not secured nation-states of their own (this is, minorities) face the problem of how to retain their political and cultural distinctiveness. If a language is elevated to the rank of national language (Ising, 1987), this means condemning a (linguistic) minority to inferiority unless they master the prescribed national language (cf. Tollefson, 1991). On the other hand, non-dominant ethnolects (of minorities) tend to be appropriated by the national language as ‘its’ dialects. This ‘justifies’ the national language’s dominating role and leads to the homogenization of the ethnolects so that they merge with the national standard. More often than not it also entails the assimilation of the minorities with the successful nation (Weber, 1976: 67-94, 452-470).

The Szlonzoks

The Szlonzoks call themselves ‘Silesians’. This ethnonym is derived from the name of the region of Silesia that extends 300 kilometers from Katowice (Kattowitz)22, Poland in the east to Görlitz, Germany in the west. But they have
been the inhabitants only of the eastern half of this large region. This half goes by the name of Upper Silesia. Traditionally, the Szlonzoks were a peasant Slavophone population. The estates (social elites), never constituting more than five per cent of the population, spoke German or were bilingual in this language and the local Slavic dialect. Lower Silesia (including all the social strata) was overwhelmingly German/Germanic-speaking and its inhabitants, in line with *Landespatriotismus* (regional identity) referred to themselves as ‘Silesians’ too. In 1740-42 Friedrich the Great seized seven-eighths of Silesia from the Habsburgs leaving Maria Theresia with the southernmost fragment of Upper Silesia. This ‘Austrian Silesia’ consisted of two territories separated by the Moravian wedge, which became known as West and East Silesia. In a way, they reflected the linguistic situation in Lower and Upper Silesia. The overwhelmingly Slavophone populace of East Silesia also became known as ‘Silesians’, even though ethnically they differed from the Szlonzoks (Kwaśniewski, 2000: 12). For the sake of clarity I refer to the former as the Slunzaks in order to distinguish them from Upper Silesia’s Slavophone group that I refer to as the Szlonzoks. I have anglicized the phonetic realization of these ethnic groups’ own ethnonyms in order to be able to differentiate among the two groups and between the mainly German/Germanic-speaking Silesians who identified with all of Silesia. Sometimes this pan-regional identification (*Landespatriotismus*) spread to all the population of Silesia irrespectively of language or religion. On the other hand, with the emergence of Upper Silesia as a distinctive administrative unit at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Upper Silesian *Landespatriotismus* came into being too (Kamusella, 1998; Kamusella, 2001a).

The Szlonzoks’ homeland is Upper Silesia. After the Napoleonic onslaught (1806) almost razed Prussia, this state underwent sweeping reforms. In their wake the Province of Silesia was subdivided into three regencies (1815). The Oppeln (Opole) Regency coincided with Upper Silesia and survived as an administrative unit until 1945 (Stütten, 1977). The political and administrative borders intersected with the ecclesiastical ones. The territory of Upper Silesia and East (Austrian) Silesia was organized within the borders of the Breslau (Wrocław) Diocese. But the southernmost strip of Upper Silesia together with West (Austrian) Silesia belonged to the Olmütz (Olomouc) Archdiocese that also contained all of Moravia. Due to the social significance of religion (Bjork, 1986), these place-names have long-established English-language forms, such as Warsaw or Cracow.

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23 The distinction between German- and Germanic-speakers alludes to the fact that before spread of the standard German the majority of the population spoke in variegated Germanic dialects. With the rise of popular elementary education German became a second language of Germanic-speakers. This phenomenon was less pronounced in Silesian than in East Prussia because the Germanic dialects of Lower Silesia were relatively close to standard German.

24 This is ‘Schlesier’ in German.

25 Pronounce /sloonzahks/. 

1999) and the immobility of the rural population the border between the two dioceses fostered the rise of the Morawec\textsuperscript{26} ethnic group in the Olmütz Archdiocese’s section of Upper Silesia (Hannan, 1996; Kamusella, 1996).

**Language in Upper Silesia\textsuperscript{27}**

From around the sixth century Silesia had been Slavic-speaking. During the twelfth century, however, the local temporal and ecclesiastical lords began to invite settlers from the overpopulated areas of the Holy Roman Empire, the overwhelming majority of whom were Germanic-speaking (Dralle, 1991: 114-115). The meeting point between the West Germanic and North Slavic dialect continuum stabilized at the border between Lower and Upper Silesia (Kokot, 1973: 16-17, 42; Nabert, 1994). First, the stratum of literate specialists used Latin in writing before starting to use chancery German in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries (Bindewald, 1935; Lubos, 1995: 26-28). Due to the Slavophone character of Upper Silesia and the need for improved comprehension of documents among the wider circles of the estate members, chancery Bohemian began to replace its German counterpart especially from the sixteenth century onward (Knop, 1967: 6, 24). Chancery Polish was present too but to a limited degree. It was connected to the pawning of the Oppeln (Opole) Duchy to the Polish-Lithuanian king in the mid-seventeenth century and the increasingly only formal subjection of the Breslau (Wrocław) Diocese to the Gniezno metropolitan see—the seat of the Polish primate. In 1821 the papal bull terminated this arrangement and also formalized the 1811 transfer of the easternmost slither of Upper Silesia from the Polish-speaking Cracow Archdiocese to the Breslau (Wrocław) Diocese (Köhler, 1997: 2).

The 1740-1742 Prussian seizure of Silesia meant the gradual replacement of chancery Bohemian and chancery Polish with standard German as the language of administration and education. This process accelerated at the beginning of the nineteenth century (Kneip, 1999: 25). The role of the Catholic Church in politics was limited by secularization (1810). In 1811 serfdom was abolished, which allowed for the introduction of compulsory military service for all males during the ‘War of Liberation’ (1813-1815). Popular elementary education commenced in 1825 (Wanatowicz, 1996: 27) and the right of graded vote for all males was introduced in Prussia in 1849. The 1871 foundation of the German nation-state in the form of the German Empire completed this process of building the German nation steeped in the German language. This also meant the equalization of the legal and political status of the male population. Jews

\textsuperscript{26} Pronounce /moravets/.

\textsuperscript{27} For a broader review of the problematic see Kamusella (1999a).
The emancipation of Jews in Prussian Silesia had already started at the close of the eighteenth century (Bahlcke, 1996: 94). Enfranchisement of women took place only after 1918. In Upper Silesia Latin remained the only language of the liturgy until the beginning of the 1970s.

Increased social and spatial mobility (usually limited to males) within the borders of Prussia and the German Empire, coupled with popular literacy achieved in the third quarter of the nineteenth century (Hytrek, 1996: 41), provided the burgeoning industry with an indispensable literate workforce. In turn, industrialization fed the state administration with the necessary revenue that made these achievements possible (Schofer, 1974). The Upper Silesian industrial basin (located in the region’s easternmost slither) emerged as second in continental Europe and the German Empire only to the Ruhr (Komarek, 1998).

The clear political emergence of non-German national movements in the revolutionary year 1848 curbed German nationalism and led to a certain acceptance for other languages. In Upper Silesia this strengthened the position of the Catholic Church. Because it controlled elementary and secondary education, in 1848-1849 standard Polish and Moravian were introduced as the media of instruction in the Slavophone areas of Upper Silesia within the borders of the Breslau (Wrocław) Diocese and the Olmütz (Olomouc) Archdiocese, respectively (Plaček, 1996; Świerc, 1990). The pro-state Protestant Church also followed this path but this was of more consequence for Lower Silesia as in the Oppeln (Opole) Regency ninety per cent of the population were Catholics (Bahlcke, 1996: 94, 103; Michalkiewicz, 1970: 125-126).

Standard Polish and Moravian functioned as ecclesiastical languages. However, Moravian mainly based in its written form on the subdialects of southern Upper Silesia and northern Moravia was closer to the speech of the Morawecs than standard Polish to the Szlonzoks’ vernacular. In the latter case, Polish-language and bilingual Polish-German education fostered situational bi- or trilingualism. In church Szlonzoks tended to use standard Polish (apart from the liturgy)\(^{30}\), German while contacting state administration and their Slavic dialect in the family and among themselves (cf. Wicherkiewicz, 1996). The situation was more complicated in the rapidly industrializing and urbanizing Upper Silesian industrial basin (cf. Klaußman, 1996). The sustained intensive interaction between workers and, then, spouses speaking dialects stemming from the Germanic and Slavic dialect continua, gave rise to the Upper Silesian Slavic-Germanic creole in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Its forms ranged

\(^{28}\) The emancipation of Jews in Prussian Silesia had already started at the close of the eighteenth century (Bahlcke, 1996: 94).

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from one extreme of the Slavic dialect and ecclesiastical standard Polish to the other of standard German and the Germanic dialect (Hannan, 1996: 106, 123; Kamusella, 1998a; Reiter, 1960: 52).

Berlin gradually embraced German nationalism against Vienna in a bid for dominance in the German Confederation. The obvious goal was to create a German nation-state after Prussia had defeated the Austrian Empire in 1866. This was duly reflected in the language policy directed at Upper Silesia. In 1863 German became the medium of education starting with the second grade of the elementary school. During the Kulturkampf (war of cultures) Berlin separated the educational system from the Catholic Church in 1872, and standard Polish and Moravian were banned from education. In 1875 religion classes also ceased to be taught in these languages. So the use of Polish and Moravian was limited to pastoral services and sermons and to religious instructions offered to children in churches (Plaček, 1996: 7-8). This situation thanks to the support of the Church spurred the publication of mainly religious books and periodicals in these languages (Glensk, 1992; Gröschel, 1993). On the plane of this anational policy this Church completely dominated the political scene of Upper Silesia until 1918 (Bahlcke, 1996: 104; Bjork, 2001).

The ideological grounding of the German nation-state in Protestantism and the German language alienated the Szlonzoks. Their Catholicism became a liability and the submergence of Prussia in the German Empire made their steadfast identification with this ex-state and the Prussian king obsolete. Berlin’s novel ennationalizing policy contributed to the eventual formation of the Szlonzoks as an ethnic group (Bąk, 1974: 48-49; Kamusella, 1998). The arrival of Polish nationalist activists from Posen (Poznań) in the 1890s did not alter this situation. Prior to 1914 these activists numbered 120 (Molik, 1993: 77) and the users and members of Polish/Polish-language libraries and associations amounted to forty-fifty thousand, that is, two per cent of the population of the Oppeln (Opole) Regency. At that time the German national group of Upper Silesia corresponded to the German-speakers (one million, forty-five per cent). Hence, the Szlonzoks amounted to 1.1 million (fifty per cent), while the Morawecs to fifty-sixty thousand (2.5 per cent) (Kamusella, 1998; Pallas, 1970: 9-48; Stüttgen, 1977: 182).

31 The Kulturkampf amounted to an ideological struggle between the Prussian state and the Catholic Church. The former stood for the particularistic ideology of nationalism and the latter for the universalistic one of Catholicism (Fischer-Wollpert, 1990: 299-300).
32 Significantly, prints in Moravian were brought out in Gothic type that additionally differentiated this language from standard Czech and standard Polish.
The Szlonzokian ethnolect

What is the Szlonzokian ethnolect? First of all, it is the tradition of situational multilingualism. Ideally, the Szlonzok spoke the Slavic dialect/Slavic-Germanic creole, standard German and standard Polish in different spheres of social life. Because women did not participate in public and political life until after World War I, the female Szlonzoks had a worse command or no knowledge of standard German (cf. Triest, 1864: 36). Their forte was the dialect/creole and they excelled in the passive command of standard Polish. Only local clergy were fully literate in both the standard languages and retained their knowledge of the dialect/creole acquired from their parents (cf. Miodek, 1991: 11).

The Szlonzoks themselves when they spoke po naszymu (in our own way) they meant the dialect/creole. They also designated it as nosza ślonsko godka (our Silesian speech). In the 1870s and 1880s when Berlin was waging the Kulturkampf with the Catholic Church the local clergy attempted to overhaul the dialect/creole into a distinctive and separate Upper Silesian language (Wanatowicz, 1992: 51). But the Breslau Bishop reached a modus vivendi with Berlin in the latter half of the 1880s so any official support for the codification of this language ceased. (Galos, 1996: 189). Thus, in the written form the dialect/creole was preserved only in verbatim court testimonies and a few humorous prints (Jasińska, 1997; Obrączka, 1997).

The present-day reader may ask if there is any written tradition of this dialect/creole. The creole being a relatively recent development in the context of high ennationalizing pressure of standard German and standard Polish, it seems to have no significant written tradition apart from the above-mentioned prints and court testimonies. The dialect was, however, quite extensively used in

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33 Because of the multilingual character of Upper Silesia and the increasing role of language as the core of ethnic or national identification, code-switching and code-mixing became a common phenomenon. Here I do not consider their social and political role or that of diglossia due to the brevity of this article.

34 For this saying (and further ones) in the Szlonzokian Slavic dialect I have used Polish spelling. In research on Upper Silesia and the Szlonzoks one can also come across quotations in Szlonzokian jotted down in German and Czech spelling (for instance, po naschimu, po našýmu), or in phonetic notation. However, my use of Polish orthography for writing down the Szlonzokian dialect should not be interpreted as an argument for subsuming the Szlonzoks into the Polish nation or their ethnolect into the Polish language; it is simply a matter of convenience in the absence of any standardized Szlonzokian spelling. It only befits that the Szlonzoks themselves undertake such political decisions. The scholar's task is to describe and analyze a given problematic, not to alter it.

35 These terms one can hear in a Szlonzokian village or urban neighborhood to this day.

36 German authors used elements of this creole (written down in accordance with the rules of German spelling) to denote the Szlonzokian/Upper Silesian specificity in novels and stories (cf. Kaluza, 1935: 64-65).
religious literature beginning with the sixteenth century though, today, scholars
display an anachronistic penchant (cf. Kamusella, 2000) for identifying this
corpus of writings with chancery Polish or chancery Bohemian or even with
standard Polish and standard Czech. Those writings that they claim as ‘Polish’
correspond to the Szlonzokian and Slunzakian dialects, whereas those dubbed as
‘Czech’ to the Morawec and Slunzakian dialects (Lubos, 1974: 478-496, 587-
601).

A choice of transcribed oral texts, poems and official eighteenth-century
documents in chancery languages, which interacted with the Szlonzokian
subdialect of Sankt Annaberg (Góra św. Anny) can be found in Olesch (1959: 88-
107). It is interesting that in 1959 this German scholar of Szlonzokian origin
(Lipnicki, 1999) termed this subdialect as ‘Polish’. Before World War II he had
termed it ‘Slavic’ (Olesch, 1937). Perhaps the incorporation of all of Upper
Silesia into postwar Poland convinced Olesch that this political act also
extended to the linguistic reality?

Protestant writers from the Lower Silesian Duchy of Brieg (Brzeg) (which
bordered directly on Upper Silesia) transplanted the tradition of writing and
publishing in a local Slavic dialect to would-be East (Austrian) Silesia37 in the
eighteenth century. This tradition continued there, while the introduction of
standard German and standard Polish extinguished it in Upper Silesia (Wronicz,
1995: 13-16). Hence, the use of the Slunzakian ethnolect in writing and print
continued in East (Austrian) Silesia until 1918 as did that of the Morawec
ethnolect in the south of Upper Silesia.

However, that there was a difference between the Szlonzokian dialect and
chancery/standard Polish was clearly understood. In the 1804 phrasebook Der
hoch- und plattenpolnisch Reisegefährte für einen reisenden Deutschen nach
Süd-Preußen und Oberschlesien38 the anonymous author distinguished between
‘Hochponish’, this is, chancery/literary Polish and ‘Plattenpolnish’, this is the
Upper Silesian Slavic dialect, by analogy to Hochdeutsch (standard German)
and Plattdeutsch (Low German today spoken in northern Germany) (Rospond,
1948). In the 1821 Nauka sztuki położniczej dla niewiast39 in standard Polish the
publisher wishing to market it in Upper Silesia found it necessary to supplement
this handbook with a glossary of important terms translated into the ‘górnosłąski
język’ (Upper Silesian language) (Mayer, 1956).

37 That is, the eastern half of Austrian Silesia separated from the western half by the Moravian
wedge. Prior to the introduction of new divisions in the eighteenth century East Silesia
corresponded to the Duchy of Teschen (Cieszyn/Těšín).
38 The High and Low Polish Phrasebook for a German Traveling in Southern Prussia and
Upper Silesia (my translation).
39 The Handbook of the Art of Midwifery for Women (my translation).
Beginning with the seventeenth century this dialect began to be known as ‘Wasserpolnisch’. It is of unclear origin but this term translates as ‘Water Polish’. This gave rise to two interpretations of its sociolinguistic nature. First, that the speech of the Szlonzoks is a kind of ‘kitchen Polish’ (popsuta polszczyzna) (Pallas, 1970: 19-20). And, second, that it is ‘Slawodeutsches’ (Slavic German) (Schuchardt, 1884). The first designation correlates more with the dialect, while the latter reflects the emergence of the creole. Under the influence of teachers and intellectuals, in the second half of the nineteenth century the Szlonzoks began to perceive their vernacular as ‘uncultured’. This prevented the fledgling Szlonzokian language movement, which was active in the 1860s and 1870s, from using this dialect/creole for writing and publishing (Pallas, 1970: 25). Eventually, only standard German and standard Polish were deemed to be suitable for writing and publishing.

Due to the specific Central European coupling of language with nationalism, German nationalists and administration preferred to present Wasserpolnisch as a language separate from Polish not unlike the Slavic vernaculars of the Kashubs and the Mazurs (Pallas, 1970: 27). On the other hand, the Polish teacher Jerzy Samuel Bandtkie, who worked at Breslau (Wrocław) from 1791 to 1811, considered the Szlonzokian dialect a variation of the ‘Polish language’. But he did not identify the Szlonzoks with the Poles, preferring to call them ‘Polish Silesians’ (Bandtkie, 1952). Another Polish scholar, Lucian Malinowski, chose to call the dialect ‘Slavic’ (1873).

There was some intellectual confusion about what the Szlonzokian dialect ‘really is’. In the Prussian and German censuses the category of the Polish language was used for noting the Slavic dialect and Slavic-Germanic creole of Upper Silesia. It was so even though the Prussian/German statisticians used the categories of the Moravian (this is, Morawec) and Bohemian languages and not that of the Czech language, as well as of the Kashubian and Mazurian languages and not of the Polish language (cf. Weber, 1913; Pallas, 1970: 30). Traditionally the Slavic-speaking part of Upper Silesia was referred to as ‘Polish Silesia’

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40 The Kashubs survive to this day in the area around the city of Gdańsk (Danzig). In the 1990s they re-affirmed their ethnic difference vis-à-vis the Polish nation by codifying their language, which is used as the medium of instruction in a handful of elementary schools attended by Kashubian children (Brez, 2001; Synak, 1998).

41 Due to polonization the Mazurs disappeared as a distinctive group but there remain some publications in their language printed in the Gothic type (black letter) (Blanke, 2001; Sakson, 1990).

42 Father of the famous anthropologist Bronisław Malinowski.

43 The present-day Polish linguists consider Lucian Malinowski’s study as the ‘first scientific work devoted to a Polish dialect’ (Deyna, 1994: 9). This interpretation, in a way, appropriates the Slavic subdialects Malinowski researched, for the Polish language, precluding the equally valid possibility of considering them dialects of the Czech or the Szlonzokian language.
Originally, this designation was not intended to emphasize or ‘prove’ the primordial Polishness of Upper Silesia. Basically, after 1848 standard Polish (and Moravian) was introduced there (in addition to German) as a medium of elementary education. Reflecting on this development the German-language press of Lower Silesia coined the sobriquet of ‘Polish Silesia’. At the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the Polish national movement appropriated this as the ‘apparent’ German acknowledgement of the ‘fact’ that Upper Silesia was Polish and should become part of the would-be Polish nation-state (cf. Snoch, 1991).

Interestingly, all the three above-mentioned Polish scholars (Bandtkie, Malinowski and Nitsch) were in one way or another connected to the Jagiellonian University at Cracow in Galicia. In 1867 Galicia obtained cultural autonomy and as of 1869 Polish became the official language in this crownland. Thus, Polish nationalism could develop there much more freely than in Russia or Prussia/Germany.

The de jure transfer of these territories de facto incorporated into Poland in 1945 took place only with the ratification of the Polish-German border treaty in 1990 (cf. Blumenwitz, 1989).
In 1919 the southern fragment of the Ratibor (Racibórz) county, known as the Hultschiner Ländchen (Hlúcínsko), was transferred to Czechoslovakia. In 1938 it returned to Germany and was re-incorporated into the Oppeln (Opole) Regency the following year. The majority of the Morawecs lived in the Hultschiner Ländchen. In the interwar period, subjected to forced czechization, they began to identify themselves as Germans and adopted the regional ethnonym of the ‘Hultschiners’. Czechs called them ‘Prájzaci’ (Prussians) (Pałys, 1997: 15; Plaček, 2000).

Between Germany and Poland

In 1922 Upper Silesia was split between Germany and Poland. The Polish section of this region together with half of East (Austrian) Silesia was shaped into the autonomous Silesian Voivodeship with its capital at Katowice (Kattowitz). The part of Upper Silesia remaining with Germany was elevated to the status of the Province of Upper Silesia. This arrangement survived until the outbreak of World War II. During the war the dramatically enlarged German Province of Upper Silesia comprised not only the Silesian Voivodeship but also the adjacent counties of Poland's Kielce and Cracow Voivodeships. This necessitated the internal division of this province’s territory into the Oppeln (Opole) and Kattowitz (Katowice) Regencies (Stüttgen, 1977; Serafin, 1996).

The 1922 division of Upper Silesia entailed the introduction of the policies of polonization and germanization into the region’s respective sections allocated to Warsaw and Berlin. The League of Nations’ supervision during the fifteen-year long transition period mitigated ennationalization but only to a limited degree. It became increasingly difficult for the international community to safeguard the national status quo in both parts of Upper Silesia after democracy was dismantled in Poland in 1926 and in Germany in 1933.

During the years 1922-1939, 190 thousand Upper Silesians who considered themselves to be Germans left the Silesian Voivodeship for Germany, and 100 thousand of those who considered themselves to be Poles the

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47 In 1919 the southern fragment of the Ratibor (Racibórz) county, known as the Hultschiner Ländchen (Hlúcínsko), was transferred to Czechoslovakia. In 1938 it returned to Germany and was re-incorporated into the Oppeln (Opole) Regency the following year. The majority of the Morawecs lived in the Hultschiner Ländchen. In the interwar period, subjected to forced czechization, they began to identify themselves as Germans and adopted the regional ethnonym of the ‘Hultschiners’. Czechs called them ‘Prájzaci’ (Prussians) (Pałys, 1997: 15; Plaček, 2000).

48 East Silesia was split between Czechoslovakia and Poland in 1920.

49 After the Munich Agreement, in 1938, Warsaw seized from Czechoslovakia most of Prague’s part of East Silesia and incorporated it into the Silesian Voivodeship. In the same year Berlin renewed the Province of Silesia. Three years later (1941), however, the Province of Upper Silesia wasre-established (Stüttgen, 1977; Serafin, 1996).

50 This transition was regulated by the longest and most detailed (over 600 articles) of all the post-Versailles treaties. Because it was signed at Geneva (1922), the document has been popularly known as the ‘Geneva Convention’ (Genfer Konvention, Konwencja Genewska) in Germany and Poland.
Province of Upper Silesia for Poland (Kamusella, 1999: 56). Polonization of the Silesian Voivodeship was immediate. All the place-names were changed and monuments reminiscent of Germandom razed. Similar alterations of ‘too Slavic-sounding’ place-names commenced in the Province of Upper Silesia in 1933. In the 1930s this was coupled with pressure on the Szlonzoks to either germanize or polonize their surnames and first names in the province and the voivodeship, respectively. The termination of the internationally supervised transition regime in 1937 allowed Warsaw to suppress German-language education, bilingual shop signs, inscriptions in public places and restaurant menus in the voivodeship. The same occurred vis-à-vis the Polish language in the province. In 1939 the intensification of retributive hostilities led to the de facto (though not de jure) complete ban on the public use of Polish in the province\(^{51}\) and of German in the voivodeship (Linek, 1999).\(^{52}\)

It is altogether too easily forgotten but prior to the division of Upper Silesia the biggest local grassroots organization was not that of Polish or German nationalists but of the Szlonzoks. After World War I Berlin wished to overhaul the whole of Silesia or Upper Silesia into a separate pro-German state. In this way the Upper Silesian industrial basin would have been saved from shouldering the overwhelming burden of war reparations and would not have fallen into Polish hands (Hauser, 1991). The Szlonzokian (proto-)national movement spearheaded by the local Catholic clergy hoped that the proposed Free State of Upper Silesia (Freiestaat Oberschlesien) would be a Szlonzokian nation-state. A state where the official bilingualism in standard German and standard Polish would have been coupled with full acceptance of the use of the dialect/creole in community and family life (Cimała in Hawranek, 1982: 23; 662). The Szlonzokian movement was based on the Związek Górnoślązaków/Bund der Oberschlesier (ZG/BdO, Union of the Upper Silesians). The ZG/BdO boasted the membership of 350 thousand to half a million (Schmidt-Rösler, 1999: 11). Bearing in mind the fact that women obtained the right to vote only in 1919 and had hardly participated in political life prior to this year, one may infer that the ZG/BdO membership coincided with well over fifty per cent of the adult male Upper Silesians. In other words, the overwhelming majority of Szlonzoks subscribed to it.

After 1922 Warsaw and Berlin successfully suppressed the Szlonzokian national movement. In the Silesian Voivodeship, initially, pro-Polish Szlonzoks were allowed to take high posts in the civil service. Not knowing any standard language but German they even corresponded with the central authorities in it.

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\(^{51}\) This ban also applied to Moravian.

\(^{52}\) A year earlier a ban on the use of the Czech language was introduced in the new section of the Silesian Voivodeship seized from Czechoslovakia. Berlin retained this ban after the 1939 annexation of Poland.
Soon German was phased out from voivodeship civil service and knowledge of the dialect/creole was not deemed as amounting to any command of Polish. So most of the Szlonzokian officials lost their positions and were replaced with newcomers from Galicia and central Poland (Kopeć, 1980). The latter with their families numbered between forty and sixty thousand (Wanatowicz, 1982).

This situation alienated many Szlonzoks from the Polish nation-state and contributed to the fortification of their ethnic separateness or espousal of German national identification (Gerlich, 1994). The establishment of the authoritarian regime in Poland after the 1926 coup the more estranged the Szlonzoks accustomed to the well-established tradition of Prussian/German parliamentarian democracy. The incoming post-1926 administration of the voivodeship decided to ameliorate this situation especially in the wake of the economic collapse spurred by the Great Depression.

On the ideological plane this amounted to acceptance of the Szlonzokian dialect as part of the voivodeship’s cultural life. But the tentative espousal of the dialect was not extended to the creole, which was ridiculed as a ‘Polish-German jargon’. The elevation of the socio-political status of the dialect entailed ‘purifying’ it of German and Czech linguistic loans. This de facto polonization of the dialect made it into a dialect of the Polish language (Kopeć, 1980). The Polish-language popular education, compulsory military service, the press, cinema and radio accelerated this process. The change was dramatic. The Polish writer Kornel Makuszyński wrote that he ‘could not communicate with the [Slavic-speaking] youth from Upper Silesia prior to 1914 but now [this is, in the 1930s] they speak pure Polish’ (in Kopeć, 1980: 46). The goal of this policy was obvious: to transform the Szlonzoks from an ethnic group/proto-nation into a regional group of the Polish nation (Kopeć, 1980: 46).

While the appropriation of the Szlonzokian dialect as a constituent of the Polish language underlay the policy of polonization of the Szlonzoks, in the Province of Upper Silesia the German authorities continued to emphasize the separateness of this dialect vis-à-vis standard Polish. The first step was to limit the encroachment of standard Polish that the transitory regime allowed for in the minority education and publications. Berlin was quite successful at this especially in the late 1930s. Another step amounted to declaring the Szlonzoks as an ethnic group with two mother tongues: the Upper Silesian language (this is, the dialect/creole) used at home and German used in official contexts (Pallas, 1970: 30-31).

This theory was compatible with what the Szlonzoks thought about themselves and their situation after 1918, and made it possible to claim them for the German nation as an ‘Adoptivstamm’ (adopted tribe). The Slavic-speaking
Kashubs, Mazurs and Sorbs were also recognized as ‘adopted tribes’ (Eichenberger, 1994: 36). Simultaneously, the category of the eigensprachiger Kulturdeutsche was developed to denote a ‘non-German-speaking German united with Germandom through the shared German culture’ (Pallas, 1970: 31). This decoupling of language and nationality allowed the Szlonzoks, Kashubs, Mazurs and Sorbs to be construed as communities of the German culture, and thus their unambiguous incorporation into the German nation.

The emphasis placed on other cultural markers besides language and religion. Ethnographers had already found out that these markers (not unlike language) changed gradually, forming an overall Central European ethnographic continuum that spanned the cleavages between the various dialect continua in this region of Europe (Gayre, 1944; Hannan, 1996: 57). This non-linguistic but culturally/ethnographically determined ideological base gave rise to classifying the Szlonzokian dialect/creole as a dialect of the German language. A dialect connected to the language not because of its genetic interrelation but thanks to the non-linguistic cultural (ethnographic) commonality of the Szlonzoks with the German nation (Pallas, 1970: 31).

Official censuses, however, were a poor reflection of these ideological endeavors. The only linguistic categories used in the Province of Upper Silesia were German- and Polish-speakers, or German-Polish bilinguals. The germanizing pressure resulted in 385 thousand bilinguals and only ninety-nine thousand Polish-speakers registered in the 1933 census. In the 1939 census the number of Polish-speakers plummeted to a mere 3.7 thousand and of the bilinguals to thirty-seven thousand. Interestingly, however, the latter number also included quite a few persons who declared their language as ‘Upper Silesian’ (oberschlesisch). The authorities let them do so though declaring such a language earlier had been impossible (Kneip, 1999: 137-138).

There can be only one nation...

All of Upper Silesia returned to Germany in 1939, and, in 1945, Moscow transferred this province to the postwar Poland. In turn, Berlin and Warsaw strove to homogenize Upper Silesia and its inhabitants so that they would become indistinguishable from the rest of Germany and the Germans, and the rest of Poland and the Poles, respectively.

With the arrival of the national socialists at the helm of power in Germany in 1933, it was clear that their goal was the creation of the Volksgemeinschaft, or, in other words, an homogenous German nation no longer split either by linguistic or regional differences. The road to this goal was the policy of
Interestingly, the Slunzaks were not only given the possibility of declaring their own language (Slonsakisch), but also their own nationality (slonsakisch). The Szlonzoks could choose only between German or Polish nationality. The German thinking behind this was that the Slunzaks remained much more Slavic in their ethnolect and were decisively pro-Polish in comparison to the Szlonzoks. So Berlin, first, wished to distance the Slunzaks from Polishdom. The second step would have been their incorporation into the Volksgemeinschaft (Bahlcke, 1996: 159).

Between 1939 and 1940 the police ran a summary ‘census’ (Einwohnererfassung). It was found out that in the former voivodeship’s Upper Silesian section there were one million people of German nationality, fifty thousand of Polish nationality and two thousand of Jewish nationality. 818 thousand of them spoke German, 125 thousand Polish, 105 thousand [Upper] Silesian (Schlesisch, Wasserpolnisch) and half a thousand Yiddish. Clearly, therefore, half of the Polish-speakers and all the [Upper] Silesian-speakers declared their nationality as German (Rogall in Bahlcke, 1996: 159).

This was the starting point for the germanization of the former voivodeship. Already in 1939 the pre-1922 German forms of all the place-names returned onto the map and monuments related to Polishdom were destroyed along with Polish shop signs and inscriptions displayed in public or in private. Between 1939 and 1942 all the Poles who had moved into Silesia after 1922 together with some Poles from the incorporated border counties of the Kielce and Cracow Voivodeships, were expelled to the Generalgouvernement. Eighty-one thousand in total. Their houses and flats were taken over by thirty-seven thousand ethnic Germans who had arrived in Upper Silesia from the Central and Eastern European territories accorded to the Soviet Union in the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact (Długoborski, 1983: XLVII-XLVIII).

Next, the Szlonzkian population of the erstwhile voivodeship was split into four categories and, accordingly, inscribed onto the Deutsche Volksliste (DVL, German National List). In the voivodeship’s Upper Silesian section Group I comprised eighty thousand members, Group II 165 thousand, Group III 718 thousand, and Group IV forty-seven thousand. Group I included those considered to be German, Groups II and III those germanizeable, and Group IV pro-Polish Szlonzoks who reneged their German roots (Rogall in Bahlcke, 1996: 160-161). All these measures completed a total ban on the use of Polish and Moravian (Kneip, 1999: 340). Ironically, the category of ‘Polish’ covered the

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Szlonzokian dialect/creole. Those defined as ‘Germans’ through their inscription onto the DVL, were to speak German only.

In 1945 after the short Soviet occupation Moscow gave all of Upper Silesia together with the deutsche Ostgebiete (apart from the northern half of East Prussia incorporated into the Soviet Union) to postwar Poland. The wartime Province of Upper Silesia was overhauled into the almost coterminous Silesian-Đąbrowa Voivodeship. Due to its overwhelming size, in 1950 it was split into the Opole (Oppeln) and Katowice (Kattowitz) Voivodeships, which remain largely unchanged to this day. However, since 1999 the latter has been known as the Silesian Voivodeship. The Opole Voivodeship comprises all of the interwar Province of Upper Silesia apart from its easternmost industrialized wedge, which is included in the Katowice (Kattowitz) Voivodeship. Besides this wedge, the Katowice (Kattowitz) Voivodeship contains the interwar Silesian Voivodeship and the non-Silesian territories that belonged to the interwar Kielce and Cracow Voivodeships (Kulesza, 1998: 32; Pawlak, 1997: 6).

Postwar Poland was to be an ethnically homogenous nation-state for ethnic Poles only (cf. Linek, 1997: 168). The instruments used to ethnically homogenize Upper Silesia were: ‘population transfer’ (this is, expulsion), ‘national verification’, ‘national rehabilitation’ (this is, ennationalization), ‘de-germanization’ and ‘re-polonization’ (this is, forced polonization) (Linek, 1997a).

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54 De jure it lasted until the Potsdam conference where the temporary postwar order in Europe was agreed on until it would be reaffirmed at the planned peace conference that actually never took place.
55 The official name was the Silesian Voivodeship but the voivode gen. Aleksander Zawadzki used the unofficial name, the Silesian-Đąbrowa Voivodeship, so often that it passed into common usage (Linek, 1997: 144; Linek, 2000a).
56 The previous major administrative division reform of 1975 transferred the counties of Olesno (Rosenberg) and Racibórz (Ratibor) from the Opole (Oppeln) Voivodeship to the Katowice (Kattowitz) Voivodeship. The former county returned to the Opole (Oppeln) Voivodeship in 1999.

The territorial shape of Germany's interwar Province of Upper Silesia survived longer in the borders of Poland's Opole (Oppeln) Diocese. It was established as the Apostolic Administration of Opole Silesia in 1945. The Vatican recognized the Polish ecclesiastical division of the deutsche Ostgebiete in 1972. Then this administration was elevated to the rank of a diocese. In 1992 the Holy See re-organized the ecclesiastical division of Poland. The industrial wedge extending from Gliwice (Gleiwitz) to Bytom (Beuthen) was detached from the Opole (Oppeln) Diocese and made into the separate Gliwice (Gleiwitz) Diocese. The traditional link between Opole (Oppeln) and the Wrocław (Breslau) metropolitan see was also severed, and the Opole (Oppeln) and Gliwice (Gleiwitz) Dioceses were included in the newly established Katowice (Kattowitz) or Silesian Church Province.
The prelude to expulsion was the flight and evacuation of about 400 thousand Upper Silesians (cf. Reichling, 1986: 61). The rounding up of fifty to seventy thousand Upper Silesians followed the Soviet incursion. They were dispatched to forced labor camps in the Soviet Union (Magocsi, 1995: 165; Woźniczka, 1996). Prior to their expulsion Germans and those considered to be Germans were pushed into urban ghettos and the network of more than one hundred concentration, transfer and forced labor camps (Madajczyk, 1996: 255-294; Ruszczewski, 1993). Up to 1950, in line with the decisions of the Potsdam conference (1945), 400 thousand Upper Silesians were expelled (Linek, in Cordell, 2000: 137).

Warsaw decided to consider most of the population from the interwar Province of Upper Silesia as Poles, because, first, it would ‘prove’ the ‘archaic Polish character’ of the incorporated deutsche Ostgebiete, and, second, it would help to people these territories. In order to prevent Upper Silesia from being denuded of inhabitants the authorities termed this region's population as ‘autochthons’ (autochtoni). Subsequently, they were classified into four groups reminiscent of the DVL. Group I included persons with full Polish consciousness. Group II those who knew Polish (this is, the dialect or creole) but did not feel any connection with the Polish nation. Group III comprised persons who did not know Polish but had Polish-sounding surnames or displayed other ‘traces’ of their Polish ethnic origin. And Group IV consisted of ‘indubitable Germans’ earmarked for expulsion (Lis, 1993: 25-27). This classification was the yardstick with which the Upper Silesians were judged in the process of national verification (weryfikacja narodowościowa). Basically, the population was divided into those with Polish/potentially Polish and German nationalities. The former as ‘positively verified’ were retained in Upper Silesia, while the latter as ‘negatively verified’ were ‘transferred’ (this is, expelled) to postwar Germany. In 1950 the ‘positively verified’ numbered about 900 thousand (Misztal, 1990: 306).

In the parallel process on the territory of the interwar Silesian Voivodeship those inscribed onto the DVL were nationally rehabilitated (rehabilitacja narodowościowa) as Poles. Of course, those found to be Germans were expelled. Virtually, all members of the DVL Groups III and IV and seventy per cent members of the DVL Group II were positively rehabilitated. They amounted to one million persons (Rogall in Bahlcke, 1996: 160-161; Bodakrężel, 1978: 130-131).58

57 The vast majority of the inhabitants of the deutsche Ostgebiete fled westward or were expelled to postwar Germany.
58 The processes of national verification and rehabilitation were also applied to the Kashubs and the Mazurs officially dubbed ‘autochthons’ not unlike the Szlonzoks.
The policy of de-germanization (*odniemczanie*) entailed the expulsion of Germans, the elimination of the German language and the removal of ‘German traces’. This removal meant doing away with: German place-names and geographical names, surnames and given names, German monuments, German books, periodicals and prints, German shop signs and inscriptions displayed in the public sphere as well as on graves, in flats and houses (Kneip, 1999: 344-347). This went hand in hand with re-polonization (*repolonizacja*). The policy aimed: 1) to teach standard Polish to the retained ‘autochthonous’ population of the verified and the rehabilitated standard Polish, 2) to polonize place-names and geographical names, surnames and first names, and 3) to replace German in every sphere of public and private life (Linek, 1997a: 11-12).

National verification and national rehabilitation were very humiliating processes for those who had to undergo them (cf. Berlińska, 1999: 372). The possibility of the immediate revoking of one’s Polish citizenship deepened this feeling of humiliation and made the positively verified/rehabilitated Szlonzoks distrustful of the Polish nation-state and its administration.

All the measures directed at Upper Silesia’s inhabitants were grounded in language. By 1947 a system of graded punishments for using German had developed: 1) reprimand and warning, 2) administrative change of one’s job or flat for a worse one, 3) firing from work, 4) withdrawal of the permit for conducting a private business, 5) pecuniary fee, 6) incarceration at the Gliwice (Gleiwitz) forced labor camp (Linek, 2001: 98). With time this made the Szlonzoks’ displeasure with communist-cum-nationalist Poland more acute and more widespread. The rise of democratic West Germany with its booming economy emphasized their position as second-class citizens in communist Poland. Leaving for West Germany offered them a chance for a normal life. In 1950-1990 over 600 thousand of the verified/rehabilitated and their descendants did, in fact, emigrate (Kamusella, 1999: 70; Rogall, 2000: 4).

For the verified and their descendents it was easier to leave for West Germany than for the rehabilitated and their descendents, who acquired the legally much more shaky right to German citizenship only during the wartime years (cf. Wolf, 1996). I assess the former group at 400 thousand nowadays and the latter at 1.2 million. The verified are concentrated in the rural areas of the eastern half of the Opole Voivodeship and in the territory of the interwar Oppeln Regency’s industrialized wedge included in the current Silesian Voivodeship. On the other hand, the rehabilitated form the majority of the population in the territory of the interwar Silesian Voivodeship included in today’s Silesian Voivodeship.
During communist times the only published vernacular texts that referred to the specificity of Upper Silesia or the Szlonzoks were either fairy tales and legends or collections of humorous anecdotes. For examples of completely polonized dialect texts of this kind see Kwiecień (1990), Strzalka (1976) and Simonides (1975, 1988) also record texts more faithful to their dialectal originals. For fiction written in the dialect see Musio (1989) and for a play in the creole see Bartylla-Blanke (2000). Obviously both works were brought out only in the wake of the fall of communism.

It is estimated that in 1950 half of the verified had a clear German identity, most of the rest considered themselves Szlonzoks, and a negligible minority opted for Polishdom (Linek in Cordell, 2000: 142). Nowadays, it seems that all the remaining verified and their descendants consider themselves to be Germans (Berlińska, 1999). In the case of the rehabilitated, I infer that ten per cent side either with Germandom, another ten per cent with Polishdom and the remaining eighty per cent identify themselves as Szlonzoks.

**Language and the Szlonzoks in Poland**

In communist Poland, with the exception of a few isolated cases, the transmission of the German language from one generation to another stopped. At the same time, the influence of the Polish-language print and electronic mass media polonized the Szlozkian dialect and creole (Kamusella, 1998a: 156-157). German is still spoken by the verified who attended elementary school in Germany, but these numbered no more than forty thousand at the beginning of the 1990s. The verified and their descendents who were educated after 1945 acquired a shaky command of standard Polish and their language of choice is the dialect/creole. They numbered about 230 thousand at the beginning of the 1990s (cf. Rauziński, 1992: 105). Actually this last case reflects the linguistic situation of the majority of the rehabilitated and their descendents.

Lack of knowledge of German has been compensated for by the Szloanzokian dialect/creole. The verified and their descendents have used it to emphasize their difference vis-à-vis the Polish nation, and their connection with Germandom. Today, the verified and their Polish neighbors consider this speech to be a dialect of the German language. On the other hand, most of the rehabilitated and their descendents have considered it to be their own Szlonzokian language (Wyderka, 1998).

The legitimizing role of the Polish language for the incorporation of the deutsche Ostgebiete and for retaining the verified and the rehabilitated was crucial (Linek, 2000: 243, 248-249). Thus, the Szlonzokian dialect/creole continued to be perceived as basically Polish albeit ‘in dire need of being weeded out of German and Czech linguistic loans’ (Linek, 2000: 248-249; 254).
There exists a sound lexicographic basis for the prospective standardization of the dialect/creole into an Upper Silesian language. First of all, Reinhold Olesch’s two-volume exhaustive dictionary of the Sankt Annaberg (Góra Anny) subdialect (1959). Recently popular bilingual Upper Silesian-Polish/Polish-Upper Silesian dictionaries of the dialect were published (Cząstka-Szymon, 1999; Czajkowski, 1996). And in 2000 the first volume of the specialist dictionary of the Upper Silesian subdialects appeared (Wyderka).

The Polish communist authorities propagated the anachronistic myth of the archaic Polishness of the Szlonzoks and their ethnolect worldwide. The incorporation of Upper Silesia into Poland worsened the position of Germany in the ideological contest for this region and its inhabitants. The deutsche Ostgebiete became a taboo in East Germany, and Bonn could hardly enter the fray being a creation of the Western Allies, who had conceded to Moscow’s unilateral transition of the deutsche Ostgebiete to Poland. However, international researchers have not glossed over the continuing ethnic distinctiveness of the Szlonzoks and their ethnolect vis-à-vis the Polish nation and language. Ewald Osers wrote about the ‘Silesian language’ in 1949 and, today, Norman Davies still regards ‘Silesian’ as different from Polish as Kashubian (1996: 1233).

Creating a language is a political decision (cf. Majewicz, 1989: 13-14). It is created in the close feedback of the extralinguistic reality with its linguistic counterpart. In Central Europe where language is the basis of nationalism, the extralinguistic reality of politics often seems to be of more importance than the linguistic reality.

One wonders what the future holds in store for the Szlonzokian dialect/creole? In postcommunist Poland the central authorities not longer have the communist apparatus of totalitarianism to implement whatever ideological solutions they may deem as appropriate. The society can speak back. And protected by the European system of human rights protection, they can pursue alternative ideological paths.

At present there are three ideological needs the dialect/creole can still serve. First, for the Polish ethnic nation and for pro-Polish Szlonzoks it may

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62 I use the phrase ‘Polish ethnic nation’ because as of 1997 the new Polish constitution introduced the new definition of the Polish nation that equals it with all the citizens of the Republic of Poland. Thus, the legally binding definition of the Polish nation is as civic as that of the American nation. Obviously, the practice remains largely ethnic-centered as it was
remain a dialect of the Polish language. In this arrangement the nation still contains the Szlonzoks as a regional group, while they can express their symbolical attachment to the Polish nation through their everyday and increasingly polonized speech. Second, for the middle-aged verified from the Opole Voivodeship, who are holders of German passports (Kamusella, 2001b) but do not stand a chance of mastering the German language, the dialect/creole may remain the main instrument of expressing their ideological Germanness. Third, in the context of the still valid Central European coupling of language and nationalism, the Szlonzoks continue to reaffirm their ethnic/proto-national distinctiveness through their dialect/creole.

The Poles and pro-Polish Szlonzoks as well as Szlonzoks who consider themselves to be Germans have no interest in codifying this dialect/creole into some standard Upper Silesian language. Because of the ideological meaning of language in Central Europe, such a move would separate them from rather than connect them to the Polish and German nations. The Szlonzoks, on the other hand, stand a chance of achieving quite a lot by codifying their standard Szlonzokian language. The problem is that they do not have the necessary resources or political clout at their disposal to go on with such a project.

The Polish Constitution of 1997 guarantees rights for and protection of Poland’s national and ethnic minorities. But the scope of this protection is tilted in favor of national minorities. Moreover, in Polish law there is no definition of an ethnic minority, which makes protection of such groups a dead letter. This allows the state administration to consider the Szlonzoks a regional/ethnographic group of the Polish nation and frees Warsaw from the constitutional responsibility of providing them with any minority protection at all. Therefore, in 1997, a group of Szlonzokian activists started an uphill struggle to register the Związek Ludności Narodowości Śląskiej (ZLNŚ, Association of the Population of the Szlonzokian Nationality) (Łodziński, 2000: 373).

Should they manage to register this association it would amount to recognizing the Szlonzoks as a national minority. Having gained such a status they would be exempted from meeting the five per cent threshold in the parliamentarian elections. With the potential of some 700 thousand votes they would be able to elect some four to ten deputies. The case of the ZLNŚ was lodged with the Council of Europe on the grounds that the Polish courts denying registration to this association breached Art. 11 of the European Convention of Human Rights, this is, the freedom of association. In its 2002 controversial ruling the European Court of Human Rights decided that the Polish administration acted without breaching this article when it denied registration to prior to 1997.
63 See: Gorzelik & Others (PL) at http://www.echr.coe.int/BilingualDocuments/PendCase.htm.

64 The last time the question on one's nationality was posed in a Polish census was in 1946. And then it was a specific question as to whether one was a German or not. The goal of the 1946 census was to separate Germans from Poles so that the authorities would know how many of the former remained to be expelled from postwar Poland.

65 Today, ‘Silesia’ (Śląsk) is a shorthand designation for Upper Silesia. This confusing usage (largely limited to the Polish language) dates back to the 1922 division of Upper Silesia. Because Poland's share of this region did not include any fragments of Lower Silesia, there was no need to distinguish between these two halves of historical Silesia, unlike in Germany, where the Province of Upper Silesia (Oberschlesien) bordered on the Province of Lower Silesia (Niederschlesien) until 1945. What is more, this Polish usage of Silesia to mean Upper Silesia could also be interpreted as Poland's unceasing claim to the whole of Silesia, which was granted to this state after World War II.

A similar terminological confusion abounds in Czech-language literature. The small fragment of southern Upper Silesia that remained with Vienna after 1740, and that after 1918 found its way into Czechoslovakia was popularly referred to as Austrian or Czech Silesia. Czech historians often settled for the shorthand of ‘Silesia’ (Slezsko) only. But after 1918 and 1945 Prague's demands extended to all of historical Silesia leading to a confusion between historical Silesia and Austrian/Czech Silesia.


In the meantime, the first postcommunist census took place in Poland in 2002. It differed from all the communist ones because it included the questions about the respondent's language and nationality. The ZLNŚ subsumed in the officially recognized structure of the Ruch Autonomii Śląska (RAŚ, Movement for the Autonomy of Silesia) appealed to the Szlonzoks so that they would declare Szlonzokian (śląski, górnośląski) nationality and language. Prior to the census a heated debate flared up over whether it would be legal to declare such a language and nationality or not. During the initial instructions for census takers they were told not to accept such returns. The RAŚ and Kashubian organizations protested. Eventually, in line with the democratic freedoms the matter of declaring a language and nationality was left solely to the respondent's discretion. However, numerous irregularities happened in the course of the census. For instance, census takers did not allow respondents to fill in forms on their own. They demanded the respondent fill in the nationality and language rubrics in pencil not in pen. Some census takers also filled in the rubrics as they saw fit despite the respondent's protests.

All this may contribute to lowering the number of actual declarations of the Szlonzokian language and nationality. There is also a suspicion among the RAŚ leadership that the government's decision to release the preliminary results...
of the census only in June 2003 (this is, one year later) may lead to further manipulation of the results. Nevertheless, the returns with the declaration of Szlonzokian nationality should amount to, at least, 100 thousand (Gorzelik, 2003). For the first time in history, the Szlonzoks obtained the official right to declare Szlonzokian nationality, and did not have to choose between Germandom or Polishdom only.

It is difficult to speculate about the future but recognition of the Szlonzoks as a national minority could lead to recognizing their ethnolect (dialect/creole) as a language. That would be an ideological basis for codification of the Szlonzokian language as well as for creating the Szlonzokian-language educational system. How important such a recognition is is shown by the map of Europe in the *Atlas of the World’s Languages in Danger of Disappearing* (Wurm, 1996: 27). The constant though contested use of the term ‘Kashubian language’ to describe the vernacular of the Kashubs guaranteed it a place on the map. But there is no Szlonzokian language to be seen there. And if there is not such a language it cannot be protected from extinction. This is an ironic thing to say during the European Union's Year of Languages (2001). But if we really believe that the multilingual heritage of Europe is something to be protected for future generations, then, first of all, we have to see diversity where politics makes us blind to it.

**Postscript**

The *de rigeur* of social sciences is objectivity. One should not take sides or become emotional about the problematic being examined, and one's opinions ought to be solidly grounded in facts. But this web of significance in which Man is suspended and through which he is connected to other people and the environs, is continuously spun and re-spun by all the people. It is an ongoing discourse from which the researcher cannot jump out in order to stand by it. The only access to what social sciences study as well as to being human is via this multidimensional web of dense and variegated links that people maintain with one another.

Nowadays, in the age of globalization, the basic building blocks of the social, the economic and the political are nations and languages. From the point of view of international relations the whole world is divided into nation-states. Since the end of the twentieth century, which saw the break-up of the Soviet empire, nationalism has become the infrastructural ideology of the whole globe. Whatever the differences between the United States, China, Tuvalu or Iran, all of them define themselves as nation-states and their populaces as nations. Official or national languages employed in these nation-states, by the very fact
of the accorded rank, dominate over minority languages and other language forms termed as dialects. The number of standard languages of any significance, standing at 200, closely corresponds to the number of the extant states in the world.

There are no procedures for the successful establishment or emergence of new nations (complete with their own nation-states) or standard languages. The concepts of ‘nation’ and ‘language’ are purely ascriptive labels, the application of which is politically decided. The power of such decisions is vested with the fully recognized actors of international relations, this is, nation-states. For instance, they decided to recognize the Tajik nation-states (and, by default, the Tajik nation) even though the independence of this state brought about by the collapse of the Soviet Union, was largely unwanted by the Tajiks at the beginning of the 1990s. On the other hand, despite the many-a-decade-long endeavors the thirty-million-strong Kurds have not been fully recognized as a nation and the question of their nation-state is an international taboo. The same is true of languages. The break-up of Yugoslavia not only spawned new nation-states but also apportioned them with the erstwhile common legacy of the Serbo-Croatian language, nowadays, divided into Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin and Serbian. Differences between these four languages are minute and mainly expressed through the script -- either Latin or Cyrillic or both with an addition of some odd characters. The opposite is true of the Kashubian language. Although standardized and as different from Polish as Czech, it has not been fully recognized as a language in its own right. Warsaw prefers to treat it as a dialect of Polish, and the Kashubs' voice to the contrary is hardly heard in the world because they cannot support their statement with the status of nation or with their own nation-state.

Pursuing research into the nature of languages and nations exposes the scholar to accusations that she supports or co-creates some languages or nations (cf. Hann, 1995). Such objections are not raised when she deals with other fragments of the social reality that have no immediate bearing on politics. However, politicians and other power brokers dislike scholars dabbling into their turf since this is an additional variable they have to take into account in their calculations. This is why dealing with significant issues must be protected by the often constitutionally enshrined freedom of research that stems directly from freedom of speech.

Having said this, I would like to finish on a personal note. My ten-year-long research into matters Szlonszokian and Upper Silesian has resulted in a plethora of articles and a doctoral dissertation. In the second half of the 1990s I had problems defending my dissertation in Poland. The reasons for that given by various universities were that the work was written in English or that its
analytical apparatus was interdisciplinary. Obviously, the Polish Act on Tertiary Education does not stipulate a single language in which dissertations should be written or that they must not transcend the boundaries of established disciplines. Only with my PhD degree diploma in hand was I told that my dissertation presented ‘an incorrect picture of the Upper Silesian past’. In the context of this region I spoke about variegated ethnic and national groups. But the stipulation of this admonition was that being a Pole I should have emphasized ‘the continuous and primordial Polishness of Upper Slesia’ avoiding any facts to the contrary of this view. The ethnonational vision of the world and of the unceasing struggle for fortifying Polishness still prevails at many a Polish university and in Polish political life.

However, I believe that these difficulties may not prevent scholars from probing into the significant questions of their times. Otherwise, scholarship would turn into a meaningless verbosity within the perimeters prescribed by politicians and ideologues. Obviously, in the case of my research some pro-Szlonzokian or Szlonzokian politicians, activists, movements or organizations may utilize my findings for the support of their projects aiming at building the Szlonzokian nation and at codifying the standard Szlonzokian language. But such a use of academic work, and these projects themselves do not breach the rules of democracy and liberty that leave the decision who and what they want to be to people alone. If a socially or politically significant group of persons come to a conclusion that they form a Szlonzokian nation with their own Szlonzokian language, the answer of the authorities in democratic Poland cannot be suppression or denial. It must follow Polish law and the international standards of human and minority rights protection. At the end of the twentieth century with the hindsight of post-Yugoslav and post-Soviet wars and ethnic cleansing, the consensus was reached that without observing these standards and ensuring rule of law, prevention of ethnonational conflicts is hard if not altogether impossible.

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Maps
Ethno-linguistic map of northern Moravia and Upper Silesia

(Winkler in Pallas, 1970: map)
Upper Silesia from the 12th to the 20th c.

(Gross, 1995: 647)
(Gerber, 1994: 20-21)
The Breslau (Wrocław) diocese after the division of Silesia in 1742

(Köhler, 1997: 2)